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ACTION IO-08

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 AID-00 CIAE-00 OASY-00 EAP-01 EUR-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 L-01 ADS-00 M-00 NEA-01 H-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PM-00 PRS-01 PA-01 SP-00 P-01 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 /039W PRM-10 DRL-09 G-00 PMB-00

-----CA06A5 270120Z /21

O 270108Z MAY 95

FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5250

INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RWANDA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

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WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3; GENEVA FOR RMA; ROME PASS FODAG

E.0.12356: 5/01/2005

TAGS: PREL, MARR, PREF, PHUM, UNSC, RW

SUBJECT: RWANDA: KAGAME'S LATEST POSITION; ROSG

REF: A) USUN 2137, B) KIGALI 1641 CONFIDENTIAL

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1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

## UNAMIR MANDATE RENEWAL

2. ON MAY 26, U/SYG FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ANNAN PROVIDED A BRIEFING ON SRSG KHAN'S LATEST DISCUSSION WITH KAGAME TO AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH IN NEW YORK AND AMB. FRIEDMAN IN THE DEPARTMENT. ANNAN REPORTED THAT KAGAME WAS SHOWING FLEXIBILITY REGARDING UNAMIR'S ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA. IN PARTICULAR, HE AGREED UNAMIR COULD DEPLOY OUTSIDE OF KIGALI IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS NEW MANDATE. HE ALSO AGREED THAT UNAMIR OBSERVERS COULD BE ARMED. KAGAME SHOWED NO FLEXIBILITY, HOWEVER, ON THE SIZE OF THE DEPLOYMENT. HE INSISTED ON A TOTAL UNAMIR LEVEL OF 1800 PERSONS; THIS WOULD INCLUDE ALL SUPPORT AND CIVILIAN ELEMENTS, BRINGING THE TROOP LEVEL TO LESS THEN 1000. DPKO BELIEVES A TOTAL FORCE OF ROUGHLY 2800, INCLUDING ROUGHLY 800 MORE TROOPS THEN KAGAME WILL PRESENTLY ACCEPT, IS NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT ITS MANDATE. ALL AGREED ON THE NEED TO PRESS THE RWANDANS FOR ADDITIONAL FLEXIBILITY ON THE NUMBERS. ANNAN AGREED TO DELAY ISSUANCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REPORT UNTIL AFTER MAY 30, IN ORDER TO ALLOW TIME FOR ANOTHER APPROACH. ANNAN ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUPPORTED THE IDEA OF A DIRECT APPROACH BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE TO THE GOR. USUN RECALLED THAT DPKO WAS EXPECTING A LETTER FROM KAGAME WHICH WOULD LAY OUT THE RWANDAN POSITION; IF IT ARRIVED TOO SOON, IT COULD CURTAIL FURTHER RWANDAN FLEXIBILITY.

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ROSG

3. SEVERAL NORDIC MISSIONS, THE BELGIAN MISSION AND THE CANADIAN MISSION, AS WELL AS UN DPA AND DPKO, HAVE EXPRESSED A PREFERENCE FOR HOLDING THE NEXT ROSG AFTER THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS ACTED UPON THE UNAMIR MANDATE ON JUNE 9. ALL EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT A JUNE 6 ROSG MEETING WOULD BE TOO LATE TO INFLUENCE THE GOR POSITION

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ON THE MANDATE. THE NORDICS WANT TO AVOID THE POLITICIZATION OF THE ROSG, OR ITS USE AS A TOOL TO BLUDGEON THE GOR. SEVERAL WERE SENSITIVE TO ANTAGONIZING AFRICAN SENSIBILITIES BY HAVING WESTERN DONORS SEEN TO BE TRYING TO ORCHESTRATE THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON AN AFRICAN SC ISSUE. EUROPEAN MISSIONS NOTED THAT THE ROSG MEETINGS ARE MORE PRODUCTIVE WHEN ENOUGH LEAD-TIME IS GIVEN FOR AUTHORITATIVE SPECIALISTS FROM CAPITAL TO ATTEND.

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